State v. Liles Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 39537 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-5-2012
State v. Liles Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39537
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Liles Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39537" (2012). Not Reported. 565.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/565
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
DOUGLAS ARTHUR LILES, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
---------------------) 
NO. 39537 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE PATRICK H. OWEN 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #8210 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, 10 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT -APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................... 3 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 4 
I. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Liles Due Process 
And Equal Protection When It Denied His Motion To 
Augment The Appellate Record With The Necessary 
Transcript ........................................................................................ 4 
A. Introduction ........................................................................................ 4 
B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Liles Due Process 
And Equal Protection When It Denied His Motion To 
Augment The Appellate Record With The Necessary 
Transcript ........................................................................................ 5 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Liles 
With Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied 
Him Due Process And Equal Protection Because He 
Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate 
Review Of His Sentencing Claims ................................................... 5 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide 
Mr. Liles With Access To The Requested 
Transcript Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective 
Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal ................................................ 15 
II. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked 
Mr. Liles' Probation .................................................................................. 17 
III. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To 
Further Reduce Mr. Liles' Sentence Sua Sponte Upon 
Revoking Probation .................................................................................. 19 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 23 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 24 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) .......................................................... 16 
Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860 (Ct. App. 1995) ............................................. 16 
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) ...................................................................... 8 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ........................................................ 15 
Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367 (Ct. App. 2001) .............................................. 10 
Draper v. State, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) ................................................................... 8 
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) .................................................................. 15 
Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967) ............................................................... 9 
Griffin v. lfIinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ...................................................................... 6 
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863) .................................................................... 9 
Maresh v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare ex rei. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221 
(1998) ................................................................................................................ 5 
Mayerv. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) .................................................... 9 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) .............................................................. 15 
State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103 (Ct. App. 1991) .................................................. 9 
State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416 (Ct. App. 1996) ...................................................... 9 
State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 2007) .................................................... 9 
State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006) .............................................. 9 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991) .............................................................. 5, 16 
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129 (1989) ....................................................... 16 
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29 (Ct. App. 1999) ....................................................... 9 
iii 
State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137 (Ct. App. 1989) ............................................... 17 
State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848 (Ct. App. 1983) ................................................... 6 
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 49 (Ct. App. 1984) ................................................... 10 
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26 (Ct. App. 2009) .............................................. 12 
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293 (1997) ............................................................. 19 
State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918 (Ct. App. 2003) ............................................... 18 
State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525 (Ct. App. 2001) ................................................... 18 
State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................................. 19 
State v. Morgan, Docket No 39057,2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012) .... 11, 13 
State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872 (Ct. App. 1985) .................................................. 9 
State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489 (Ct. App. 1999) ................................................ 10 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982) ................................................. 19 
State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538 (Ct. App. 1992) .................................................. 10 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102 (2009) ............................................................ 18 
State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900 (1983) ................................................................. 10 
State v. Waf/ace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) ............................................................... 10 
State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992) .................................................... 13 
State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998) ..................................................................... 5 
Constitutional Provisions 
10. CONST. art. I, §13 ............................................................................................. 5 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ....................................................................................... 5 
iv 
Statutes 
I.C. § 1-1105(2) .................................................................................................... 5 
I.C. § 19-2801 ....................................................................................................... 5 
I.C. § 19-863(a) .................................................................................................... 5 
I.C. § 20-222 ....................................................................................................... 17 
Rules 
I.C.R. 5.2(a) .......................................................................................................... 5 
I.C.R. 54.7(a) ........................................................................................................ 6 
Additional Authorities 
Standard 4-8.3(b) ............................................................................................... 17 
v 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Douglas Arthur Liles timely appeals from the district court's order revoking 
probation. On appeal, Mr. Liles argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due 
process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with a transcript of 
the June 17,2011, jurisdictional review hearing Mr. Liles requested to be created at the 
public's expense. Mr. Liles also argues that the district court abused its discretion when 
it revoked probation and failed to further reduce the length of his sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Liles was charged, by Information, with driving under the influence of alcohol 
(hereinafter, DUI) and a felony enhancement. (R., pp.25-26.) Pursuant to a plea 
agreement Mr. Liles pleaded guilty to a felony DUI and, in return, the State agreed to 
recommend probation. (11/12/10 Tr., p.1, Ls.15-24; R., pp.30-31, 44.) Thereafter, the 
district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, but retained 
jurisdiction. (R., pp.44-46.) Upon review of Mr. Liles' period of retained jurisdiction, the 
district court suspended the sentence and placed him on probation. (R., pp.52-57.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion for probation violation alleging 
that Mr. Liles violated various terms of his probation. (R., pp.72-74.) Mr. Liles admitted 
to violating the terms of his probation by consuming alcohol, becoming involved in 
unauthorized romantic relationships, and driving while his driver's license was 
suspended. (R., pp.72-75; 12/02/11 Tr., p.3, Ls.8-9, p.8, L.9 - p.11, L.7.) The district 
court then revoked probation and executed the underlying sentence, but reduced the 
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sentence to eight years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.82-85.) Mr. Liles timely appealed. 
(R., pp.87-89.) 
On appeal, Mr. Liles' appellate counsel filed a motion to augment the record with 
transcripts of the December 2, 2012, probation admit/deny hearing and the June 17, 
2011, rider review hearing. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule 
and Statement in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.) The State 
objected in part to Mr. Liles' request for the transcript of the June 17,2011, rider review 
hearing. (Objection in Part to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof' (hereinafter, Objection to Motion to 
Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order granting 
Mr. Liles' request for the December 2, 2012, probation admit/deny hearing and denying 
Mr. Liles' request for the June 17, 2011, rider review hearing. (Order to Augment the 
Record (In Part) and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule. (hereinafter, Order Denying 
Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Liles due process and equal protection 
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcript? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Liles' probation? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to further reduce Mr. Liles' 
sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Liles Due Process And Equal Protection When It 
Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With The Necessary Transcript 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent 
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the 
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need 
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant 
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to 
the issues raised on appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Liles filed a Motion to Augment, requesting a transcript of the 
June 17, 2011, rider review hearing. That request was denied by the Supreme Court. 
On appeal, Mr. Liles is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for 
the transcript. Mr. Liles asserts that the requested transcript is relevant to the issues of 
whether the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and abused its 
discretion by failing to further reduce the length of his sentence because the district 
court stated on the record that it reviewed its notes of the June 17, 2011, rider review 
hearing prior to the probation violation disposition hearing, from which this appeal was 
filed. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his request. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Liles Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With The 
Necessary Transcript 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Liles With 
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process And 
Equal Protection Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate 
Review Of His Sentencing Claims 
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO. CONST. 
art.I§13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981). 
State V. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State V. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States 
Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh V. State, Oept. of 
Health and Welfare ex rei. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, 
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); 
I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 
mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. 
I.C.R. 5.2(a). Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding 
before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to 
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"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from 
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Oryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these 
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal 
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent 
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second 
theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for 
review. The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they 
request. In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal 
protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless 
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State 
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to 
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts 
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themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants 
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[pJroviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
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In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In 
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of 
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to 
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access 
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. 'This principle is no less 
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase 
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of 
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In Draper v. State, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement 
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be 
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State 
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or face procedural default. "It is well established that an appellant 
bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can 
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record 
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court." 
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 
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(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes, 
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, 
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel 
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's 
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Liles fails to 
provide the appellate court with the requested item, the legal presumption will apply and 
Mr. Liles' claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action alone, 
which prevents him from access to the requested item, then such action is a violation of 
due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer apply. 
Whether the transcript of the requested proceeding was before the district court 
at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the 
transcript is relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing decision, 
a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing 
from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained 
from its own official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-
74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900,907 (1983) (recognizing that 
the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard 
during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could 
rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has 
observed in the courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein 
involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing 
court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously 
dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he 
already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearings 
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were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the information it 
already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the decision to 
revoke probation. In this case, the district court stated on the record that it reviewed its 
own original sentencing notes and "the sentencing notes at the time of the rider 
review."1 (12/30/11 Tr., p.2, Ls.20-24.) The district court went on to state as follows: 
And the Court considered all of that together with the other 
presentence materials, determined that a period of incarceration had been 
earned, and the Court retained jurisdiction. 
You went off this CAPP Rider Program. And initially you didn't do 
very well, but your attitude improved and your performance improved, and 
the department recommended that I place you on probation. 
(12/30/11 Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.8, L.2.) The district court relied on its notes of the June 17, 
2011, rider review hearing and then summarized Mr. Liles' performance while on his 
rider as part of its rationale underlying the ruling, from which this appeal was filed. 
Therefore, the requested item is relevant to the issues on appeal because the district 
court directly relied on its notes from the June 17, 2011 rider review hearing when it 
issued the order which is currently on appeal. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 
Docket No 39057, 2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012) (not yet fina!), which addressed 
the foregoing argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on 
probation. Id. at 1. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the 
terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction. 
Id. at 1-2. After completing the rider, the district court placed the defendant on 
probation. Id. at 2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and 
1 This fact was not addressed in the Motion to Augment and, therefore, was not before 
the Idaho Supreme Court when it denied Mr. Liles request for the transcript of the 
June 17, 2011, rider review hearing. 
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the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed from the district 
court's second order revoking probation. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with 
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the 
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal 
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary 
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation 
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its 
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4. 
While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, at this point 
this case is not final. As stated above, the district court relied on its own notes of the 
hearing at issue when it decided to revoke probation. (12/30/11 Tr., p.2, Ls.20-24.) 
Moreover, this case is distinguishable from Morgan because Mr. Liles is challenging not 
only the order revoking probation, but also the length of his sentence, which entails an 
analysis of the district court's sentencing rationale. 
Additionally, the requested item is within an Idaho appellate court's scope of 
review. The requested transcript is relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all 
proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court made 
appropriate sentencing determinations. See State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 
28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following 
a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before 
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and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and 
the revocation of probation." (emphasis added)).2 
Further support for Mr. Liles' position can be found in State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 
20 (Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery in 
1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked and 
the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period of 
retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, which was 
ultimately revoked. Id. The district court then sua sponte reduced the length of 
Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district court 
should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that position, 
Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial. Id. The Court of Appeals 
addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the 
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the 
2 In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in 
Hanington. Specifically it held: 
In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a/l 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeaL" 
Morgan, at 4. (original emphasis). As stated above, Morgan is not a final opinion and 
Mr. Liles is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal. 
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nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit 
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his 
sentence reduction claim because he failed to provide the original PSI and a transcript 
of the original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though the original sentence was not on 
appeal, and happened years before the decision at issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
held that the transcript was necessary to address Mr. Warren's claims of error. 
Moreover, there was no indication that a transcript of that hearing was created before 
the probation violation hearing or that the district court referenced the original 
sentencing hearing at the probation violation disposition hearing. It appears that the 
Court of Appeals assumed that the original sentencing hearing would address the 
nature of the original offense. Had Mr. Liles failed to request the transcript at issue, the 
Warren opinion indicates that it would be presumed to support the district court's 
decision to execute the original sentence. 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial 
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Liles' request for the transcript will 
render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcript 
supports the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a procedural bar to 
the review of Mr. Liles' appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore, 
Mr. Liles should either be provided with the requested transcript or the presumption 
should not be applied. 
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2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Liles With Access To 
The Requested Transcript Has Denied Him Due Process Because He 
Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned 
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the 
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The 
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was 
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was 
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... 
[toJ hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 
'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of 
free government which no member of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 71-72. 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants 
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
Doug/as was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United States Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Doug/as that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
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The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcript prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the 
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is 
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any 
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Liles has not obtained 
review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective 
assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of 
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal 
Justice, The Defense Function. These standards offer insight into the role and 
responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . .. Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
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Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcript, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
decision to revoke probation. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Liles on the 
probable role the transcript may play in the appeal. 
Mr. Liles is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and effective 
assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant transcript. 
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Liles his constitutional right to due 
process which includes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. 
Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the requested 
transcript and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental 
briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Liles' Probation 
Mr. Liles asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its 
discretion when it revoked his probation. When a defendant appeals from an order 
revoking probation the Idaho Court of Appeals has utilized the following framework: 
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence 
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation 
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the 
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation 
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct. App. 1987). 
State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Mr. Liles concedes that he violated the terms of his probation. Accordingly, he 
only contests the district court's decision to revoke his probation. "A district court's 
decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the 
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court abused its discretion." State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). "When a 
district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court correctly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 
(Ct. App. 2003). "In deciding whether revocation of probation is the appropriate 
response to a violation, the court considers whether the probation is achieving the goal 
of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is consistent with the protection of 
society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Mr. Liles has collegiate aspirations and support from the Veterans Administration. 
Mr. Liles' counsel made the following comments at the probation violation disposition 
hearing: 
He completed successfully the CAPP Rider Program. As he sits here 
before you today, he appears to be an inmate worker. He's dressed in 
white, seems to be doing well in custody. He advises me he's a student at 
Boise State, is still enrolled in school and has housing he is about to lose. 
He would very much like to be placed back on probation. I think 
he understands the gravity of the violations to which he admitted and 
understands that he [cannot] be involved in some of those relationships. 
(12/30/11 Tr., p.4, L.25 - p.5, L.10.) Mr. Liles also told the district court that he had 
developed a new respect for its orders. (12/30/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.8-9.) Mr. Liles also 
informed the district court that he was granted a service dog from the Veterans 
Administration and was participating in domestic violence and mental health treatment 
at the Veterans Administration. (12/20/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.11-14.) While Mr. Liles did not 
perform well on probation, he does have support from the Veterans Administration and 
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aspires to complete college which is enough incentive to prevent Mr. Liles from violating 
his probation in the future. 
In, sum, the district court abused its discretion when it revoked probation 
because Mr. Liles had enough support and an incentive to refrain from violating his 
probation in the future. 
III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Further Reduce Mr. Liles' 
Sentence Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation 
Mr. Liles asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of eight 
years, with two years fixed, is excessive. Due to the district court's power under 
I.C.R. 35 to reduce the length of the original sentence sua sponte upon the 
relinquishment of jurisdiction, on appeal an appellant can challenge the length of the 
sentence as being excessive. State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 400 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh 
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving 
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573,577 (1979». Mr. Liles does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Liles must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or objectives of 
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criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and 
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution 
for wrongdoing. Id. 
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Liles incorporates the arguments made in section", 
supra. 
There are various mitigating factors present in this matter which support the 
conclusion that Mr. Liles' sentence is excessively harsh. Specifically, Mr. Liles' lifetime 
of victimization is a mitigating factor. Mr. Liles was raised in a strict military household, 
and was verbally, emotionally, and physically abused by his father. (Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.9.) He said his father had a sadistic love to 
beat people. (PSI, p.13.) On one occasion, Mr. Liles remembers passing out because 
his father was choking him. (PSI, p.48.) 
Mr. Liles was also exposed to severe sexual abuse as an adult. Mr. Liles 
enlisted in the military in 1979 and was honorably discharged. (PSI, p.11.) However, 
while in the military he was repeatedly "raped by other soldiers." (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Liles 
reported the sexual abuse to his supervising officers, but they ignored him. (PSI, p.11.) 
Mr. Liles' suffers from post traumatic stress disorder which was caused by the sexual 
abuse he was exposed to in the military. (PSI, p.13.) Mr. Liles is afraid of being around 
groups of males and is paranoid when people stand behind him. (PSI, p.48.) "He will 
pay attention to hearing cars outside his home and sometimes counts how many people 
are in the car and how many [car doors] slam to evaluate where people are and what 
they might be doing." (PSI, p.48.) Due to the foregoing experiences, Mr. Liles scored in 
the high range of the Generalized Victimization Scale. (PSI, p.64.) 
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There is a causal relationship between Mr. Liles' victimization and his criminal 
behavior. Mr. Liles' criminal history began after he was discharged from the military. 
(PSI, p.16.) Mr. Liles told the presentence investigator that his criminal behavior was a 
means to rebel against authority "since he was angry that no one had helped him when 
he was victimized." (PSI, p.8.) There is a possibility that Mr. Liles' developed a mistrust 
for authority figures because both his father and his supervising officers failed to protect 
him and actually either caused or enabled further abuse. This could have also 
contributed to his criminal behaviors. 
Additionally, Mr. Liles' mental health issues are mitigating factors. Mr. Liles 
suffers from anxiety and PTSD. (R., p.34.) Mr. Liles must have realized that he had 
some mental health problems because he was in the process of getting mental health 
evaluations before he committed the instant offense. (PSI, pp.2-3, 12.) It is important 
to note that Mr. Liles did recognize he had mental health issues, the same issues linked 
to his criminal behavior, and was voluntarily seeking treatment prior to the commission 
of the instant offense. 
Additionally, Mr. Liles' substance addiction is a mitigating factor. Mr. Liles was 
diagnosed as being dependent on alcohol, but received a recommendation for intensive 
outpatient treatment. (PSI, pp.55, 66.) Mr. Liles was drinking on the night of the instant 
offense as a means to cope with a stressful divorce and the fact his former spouse stole 
over eight thousand dollars from him. (PSI, p.49.) 
Additionally, Mr. Liles' collegiate aspirations are mitigating factors. Mr. Liles 
completed high school and two years of college. (R., p.34.) Prior to sentencing, 
Mr. Liles was attending Boise State University with the goal of earning a Bachelor 
Degree in social work. (01/21/11 Tr., p.34, Ls.12-19.) He also has plans to earn a 
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master's degree from Oral Roberts University in Oklahoma so he can be a social worker 
with a faith based emphasis. (01/21/11 Tr., p.30, Ls.13-18, p.34, Ls.12-19; PSI, p.11.) 
His trial counsel stated the Mr. Liles "seems like a bright guy, he's certainly capable of 
the plans that he's made." (01/21/11 Tr., p.31, Ls.13-15.) In the event Mr. Liles 
accomplishes this goal he will have a strong incentive to control both his addiction and 
criminal behavior. 
Further, Mr. Liles' employment background and financial support from the 
Veterans' Administration are mitigating factors. While Mr. Liles does have many 
occupationally based skills, he has difficulty mainting employment due to his mental 
health issues. (PSI, p.12.) At the time of sentencing, he was receiving disability checks 
from the government and characterized himself as being fifty percent disabled. (PSI, 
p.12.) However, he did maintain one job for ten to fifteen years as an electrician. (PSI, 
p.49.) Mr. Liles also receives benefits through the Veterans Administration. 
Finally, Mr. Liles did express remorse and accepted responsibility. At 
sentencing, Mr. Liles expressed his remorse and accepted the fact that his actions 
posed a risk to society. (01/21/11 Tr., p.34, Ls.12-13, p.38, Ls.1-7.) Mr. Liles said that 
he was ashamed of his behavior. (PSI, p.3.) 
In sum, there are various mitigating factors which support the conclusion that 
Mr. Liles' sentence is excessively harsh. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Liles respectfully 
requests that this Court remand this matter with instruction to place him on probation. 
Alternatively, Mr. Liles respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of the 
indeterminate portion of his sentence. Alternatively, Mr. Liles respectfully requests that 
this Court reduce the length of his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 5th day of September, 2012. 
~} J 
,,- ~~.-~ (~ 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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